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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 16-3600 
__________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
    
v. 
 
ERIC VANDERBECK, 
       Appellant 
 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(Crim. No. 3:15-cr-00165) 
District Judge: Hon. Freda L. Wolfson 
__________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 11, 2017 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, FUENTES, Circuit Judge,  
and STARK,† Chief District Judge 
 
(Filed: July 21, 2017) 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________ 
          
 
                                              
† Honorable Leonard P. Stark, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware, sitting by designation. 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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sSTARK, Chief District Judge. 
 Erik Vanderbeck (“Vanderbeck” or “Defendant”) appeals his conviction for child 
pornography offenses.  We will affirm. 
I 
A 
 Vanderbeck is a 47-year-old male who resided in Bayonne, New Jersey, during all 
relevant times.  From 2011 to 2014, Vanderbeck used online messaging services to 
communicate with underage females, asking them to send him sexually explicit 
photographs and videos of themselves.   
 Law enforcement first learned of Defendant’s activities in November 2013, when 
the mother of one of his victims located in Missouri intercepted what she believed to be a 
suspicious package addressed to her daughter.  The intercepted package contained “a 
vibrator, a black t-shirt, a Ziplock storage bag, and a return envelope” that was addressed 
to Defendant’s address in New Jersey.  (App. at 937-38)  Law enforcement interviewed 
the victim, who admitted that she had been engaging in sexually explicit email 
communications with Defendant since around October 2013.  After obtaining the victim’s 
consent, law enforcement assumed the victim’s online identity for purposes of 
communicating with Defendant.   
 Thereafter, a Missouri state court judge signed a warrant to search Defendant’s 
email account “for evidence of violations of . . . state sex offense statutes.”  (Id. at 939)  
The subsequent search executed pursuant to that warrant “revealed sexually explicit 
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communications between [Defendant] and several other minor females as far back as in 
or around 2011.”  (Id. at 940)  Of these minor female victims, three – referred to as Amy, 
Casey, and Joanna – are most relevant to the issues here. 
 Amy began communicating with Defendant when she was 13 years old.  In his 
communications with Amy, Defendant assumed the name “Bubba” and claimed to be in 
his early twenties.  At Defendant’s request, Amy sent pornographic images of herself, 
and Defendant sent Amy other pornographic images.  Amy further complied with 
Defendant’s request to share images of her performing sex acts on herself.  When Amy 
attempted to end her contact with Defendant, Defendant refused, and threatened to “do 
something physical” to her if she stopped.  (Id. at 588)  He further threatened to post 
Amy’s images on different websites and send them to her father.   
 Casey began communicating with Defendant in 2013 when she was 15 years old.  
With her, Defendant again used the pseudonym “Bubba,” telling Casey he was 18 years 
old.  During the course of their online communications, Casey sent Defendant several 
pornographic pictures of herself at Defendant’s request.   
 Joanna began communicating with Defendant in 2014 when she was 15 years old.  
Defendant identified himself to Joanna as a 16-year-old girl named “Megan.”  When 
Joanna requested a picture to confirm Megan’s identity, Defendant sent Joanna a picture 
of Amy.  Eventually, Defendant introduced Joanna to Megan’s 18-year-old brother, 
“Andrew.”  Andrew sent Joanna pornographic pictures, and – in response to Andrew’s 
threats to post other pictures of her online – Joanna sent Andrew pornographic pictures.   
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B 
 The federal investigation into Vanderbeck’s online activities began in April 2014.  
On June 26, 2014, federal postal inspectors obtained a search warrant for Defendant’s 
email accounts.  Subsequently, on June 30, 2014, postal inspectors interviewed two 
underage females who had engaged in sexually explicit online communications with 
Defendant.   
 Following these interviews and the search of Defendant’s email accounts, postal 
inspectors obtained a warrant to search Defendant’s residence.  Inspectors executed the 
warrant on July 22, 2014.  In the course of the search, inspectors seized an external hard 
drive, two internal hard drives, and a cell phone.  A forensic review of these devices 
revealed 81 pornographic images of Amy, 29 pornographic videos of Amy, four 
pornographic images of Casey, one pornographic image of Joanna, and pornographic 
images of other minor victims.  (See Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) ¶ 30) 
 While the search of Defendant’s residence was ongoing, two postal inspectors – 
Greg Kliemisch (“Kliemisch”) and Ann Kolczynski (“Kolczynski”) – along with 
Bayonne Police Department Detective Brian Borow, interviewed Defendant.  The 
interview, which lasted approximately three hours, occurred in Kliemisch’s vehicle.  
Kliemisch digitally recorded the interview.  During the interview, Defendant admitted 
that he used his email address in the conversations with his victims and acknowledged 
that he assumed various identities during his online interactions with them.  Defendant 
further admitted that he knew that Amy and Casey were minors when they sent him 
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pornographic images of themselves.  Defendant also admitted that he distributed Amy’s 
pictures when he was pretending to be Megan.   
 Kliemisch’s recording did not capture anyone administering a Miranda warning to 
Vanderbeck before the interview began.  Nor did the recording reflect anyone telling 
Defendant at any time that he was free to stop the interview and leave.  However, 
Kliemisch, Kolczynski, and Borow testified at a suppression hearing that Kliemisch did, 
in fact, administer a Miranda warning, before the recorder was turned on at the start of 
the interview.  All three agents further testified that Vanderbeck had waived his Miranda 
rights.  This is also reflected in Kolczynski’s investigative report, dated July 30, 2014, 
which states that Defendant was read and waived his Miranda rights prior to the start of 
the interview.   
 After the interview concluded, Defendant agreed to be taken for a polygraph test.  
When the polygraph test concluded, Defendant was arrested.   
C 
 The case against Vanderbeck ultimately proceeded on a five-count superseding 
indictment charging him with three counts of production of child pornography, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a); one count of distribution of child pornography, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A); and one count of possession of at least three 
images of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).   
 Among the pretrial motions Defendant filed, two are pertinent to his appeal.  
Defendant moved to suppress the statements he made during the interview and also 
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moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of probable cause to support the warrant to 
search his residence.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied both 
motions.   
 Trial began on April 5, 2016.  On April 7, the District Court granted the 
government’s motion to dismiss Count One.  On that same day, Vanderbeck moved for a 
mistrial, based on Joanna’s testimony that Defendant’s communications had driven her to 
contact a suicide hotline.  The District Court denied Defendant’s motion.  On April 8, the 
jury found Defendant guilty of all remaining counts.   
 On September 12, 2016, the District Court sentenced Vanderbeck to 22 years in 
prison.  He filed a notice of appeal on the same day.1   
II 
 Vanderbeck moved to suppress the statements he gave in the interview with law 
enforcement while the search of his residence was being conducted.  He contends that the 
interview, which took place in a postal inspector’s vehicle, was a custodial interrogation, 
yet he was not administered Miranda warnings prior to questioning.2  At a hearing, the 
District Court heard the testimony of the two postal inspectors and one Bayonne police 
detective who had been involved in the interview.  Finding the witnesses’ testimony 
credible, the District Court determined that while Defendant had been in custody, he had 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this criminal case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2 Vanderbeck certified that he does not recall being read his rights, although he does not 
expressly deny that it occurred.   
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been given the required Miranda warnings and had waived his right to remain silent.3  
The Court denied the motion to suppress. 
 We review “the denial of a suppression motion for clear error as to the underlying 
facts, but exercise plenary review as to its legality in light of the district court’s properly 
found facts.”  United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 2006).  When the 
District Court’s denial of a suppression motion is based on credibility determinations, the 
“fact-finder’s determination of credibility is not subject to appellate review.”  Gov’t of 
Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 921 (3d Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds 
by Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009); see also United States v. Bethancourt, 
65 F.3d 1074, 1078, 1081 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Determining the credibility of witnesses is 
uniquely within the province of the trial court and this court will not review this 
determination.”). 
 It is unnecessary for us to decide whether Vanderbeck was in custody because the 
District Court’s finding that he was properly advised of his rights before questioning 
began, and waived those rights, is not clearly erroneous and is dispositive.4  If he was not 
in custody, the Miranda warnings were unnecessary; if he was in custody, then his rights 
were protected by the administration of those warnings and his voluntary decision 
                                              
3 See App. at 142 (District Court stating “the testimony of Inspector Kliemisch [was] 
credible,” “the Miranda warnings were indeed issued,” and “I certainly find by well more 
than a preponderance of the evidence that [Defendant] was advised of his warnings”). 
 
4 Factual determinations are clearly erroneous only if they “[are] completely devoid of 
minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility, [and] . . . bear[] no 
rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.”  Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 
1298, 1302 (3d Cir. 1972). 
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thereafter to answer questions.  See United States v. Willaman, 437 F.3d 354, 359 (3d Cir. 
2006) (“Miranda, of course, requires warnings only when the person the police are 
questioning is in custody.”); see also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) 
(“We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody 
is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.”).  The District 
Court found that all three officials involved in the interview testified credibly that 
Defendant was read his Miranda rights by Inspector Kliemisch before the questioning 
(and the recording) began, and that Defendant then waived his rights and agreed to 
answer questions.  We will not disturb these credibility findings on appeal.  See Gereau, 
502 F.2d at 921 (“It is the law of this Circuit, as well as many others, that a fact-finder’s 
determination of credibility is not subject to appellate review.”).5 
 Accordingly, the District Court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. 
III 
 Vanderbeck challenges the District Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the 
indictment based on the purported lack of probable cause to support the search warrant 
for his residence.  In Defendant’s view, probable cause was lacking because none of his 
victims could “identify[] him with sufficient precision to satisfy the veracity and 
reliability requirements for [g]overnment informants.”  (Appellee Br. at 19)   
                                              
5 Other record evidence supports the testimony the District Court credited.  For example, 
Inspector Kolczynski documented that Defendant was read and waived his Miranda 
rights prior to the interview.  Inspector Kliemisch explained that the audio recording 
failed to capture the Miranda warning because he had never before audio recorded an 
interview.   
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 “We apply a mixed standard of review to a district court’s decision on a motion to 
dismiss an indictment, exercising plenary review over legal conclusions and clear error 
review over factual findings.”  United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 2013). 
With respect to the probable cause analysis, this Court “conduct[s] . . . a deferential 
review of the initial probable cause determination made by [a] magistrate [judge].”  
United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 554 (3d Cir. 2010).  In reviewing the magistrate 
judge’s probable cause determination, this Court’s role is “to determine whether ‘the 
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.’”  Id. 
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). 
 The District Court properly denied Defendant’s motion.  Although styled as a 
motion to dismiss, Defendant’s arguments could only properly have been made in a 
motion to suppress.  See United States v. Rose, 538 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“[U]nder [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 12, a suppression argument raised for the 
first time on appeal is waived (i.e., completely barred) absent good cause. . . .  [O]ur 
holding applies . . . where the defendant failed to file a suppression motion at all in the 
district court.”); see also United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966) (“Our numerous 
precedents ordering the exclusion of . . . illegally obtained evidence assume implicitly 
that the remedy does not extend to barring the prosecution altogether.”). 
 Defendant’s contentions likewise fail on the merits.  Even assuming that his 
victims could not sufficiently identify him, and ignoring their statements, the remainder 
of the application for the search warrant amply supports a finding of probable cause to 
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believe that Vanderbeck’s residence would contain evidence of child pornography 
offenses.  As just some examples, the application referred to: the package containing “a 
vibrator, a black t-shirt, a Ziplock storage bag, and a return envelope” that was sent to a 
Missouri 14-year-old, with a return address label and return envelope with Vanderbeck’s 
name and address in New Jersey; the several searches of Defendant’s email 
communications, which “revealed sexually explicit email communications” between 
Defendant and his victims; and “[t]he results of grand jury subpoenas” to Defendant’s 
email and internet providers, which “revealed that the email account [Defendant] used to 
communicate with [his victims] was registered to an IP address registered to 
[Defendant]” at the address that the application sought to search.  (App. at 937-43) 
 Accordingly, the District Court properly denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 
IV 
 Vanderbeck’s application for a mistrial arose from the testimony of one of his 
victims, Joanna.  At the conclusion of her direct examination, Joanna stated that she had 
spoken with a suicide hotline regarding “Megan or Bubba,” aliases that Defendant used 
in his communications with her.  (See App. at 459-60)  To Defendant, Joanna’s testimony 
warrants a mistrial because it was unfairly prejudicial, “sway[ing] the jury to react on 
emotion.”  (App. at 491) 
 “We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial based on a witness’s allegedly 
prejudicial comments for an abuse of discretion.”  United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 
207 (3d Cir. 2005).  “Our inquiry focuses on whether any conduct at trial was so 
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prejudicial that [the] defendant was deprived of a fundamental right.”  United States v. 
Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1285 (3d Cir. 1993).  In the present context, “[t]hree factors guide 
this inquiry: (1) whether [the allegedly prejudicial] remarks were pronounced and 
persistent, creating a likelihood they would mislead and prejudice the jury, (2) the 
strength of the other evidence, and (3) curative action taken by the district court.”  Id.; see 
also United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 336 (3d Cir. 2010) (same). 
 Applying these factors, it is clear that the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the request for a mistrial.  Joanna’s remarks were not pronounced and 
persistent; instead, they were made once at the very end of her testimony.  The totality of 
the testimony is as follows: 
Q. Did you ever communicate with any adults in your life regarding 
Megan or Bubba? 
 
  A. Yes, ma’am. 
   
Q. Who or when or what were the circumstances? 
   
A. On a suicide hotline. 
   
[Q.] I have no further questions for this witness, your Honor. 
 
(App. at 459-60)   
These few moments of testimony in the course of a four-day trial cannot be 
viewed as “pronounced and persistent,” nor “systematic” and “permeat[ing] the 
proceedings with prejudice.”  United States v. Morena, 547 F.3d 191, 196-97 (3d Cir. 
2008); see also Riley, 621 F.3d at 336 (finding remarks made twice “in testimony that 
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spanned three days over the course of a five week trial” were not pronounced and 
persistent).6 
 Turning to the strength of the other evidence, here, as in Riley, 621 F.3d at 337, 
“there is no question that the jury did not solely rely” upon Joanna’s allegedly prejudicial 
testimony in rendering its verdict.  To the contrary, the jury heard Defendant’s own 
interview admissions that he had “solicited pornographic images” from his victims, 
known his victims were minors, and distributed his victims’ pornographic images to 
others; heard from Defendant’s victims that they had sent pornographic images of 
themselves to Defendant in response to his demands; and heard from investigators about 
the nearly 100 images of child pornography they had seized from Defendant’s electronic 
devices.  (See App. at 440-61, 482-83, 554-64, 567-611, 852, 863, 877)  Plainly, “the 
strength of the other evidence is sufficient to outweigh any possible prejudice [that 
Joanna’s] statement[] may have inflicted” on Vanderbeck.  Riley, 621 F.3d at 337.  
 As for the third factor, Defendant declined the District Court’s offer to provide a 
limiting instruction to the jury.  In the final instructions, the jury was instructed not to 
decide the case based on sympathy and prejudice.  See generally Lore, 430 F.3d at 207 
(“[E]ven though Bohn declined the district court’s offer to issue a specific curative 
                                              
6 Vanderbeck points out that during an earlier portion of Joanna’s testimony, the District 
Court excused the jury, to allow Joanna time to “compose herself” after she seemingly 
burst into tears.  (Reply Br. at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted)  While the emotional 
nature of much of this victim’s testimony may have been prejudicial to Vanderbeck, that 
fact does not transform Joanna’s fleeting reference to a suicide hotline into “pronounced 
and persistent” remarks. 
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instruction at the time of [the allegedly prejudicial] statement, the court subsequently 
instructed the jury regarding the defendants’ right to refrain from testifying.”)). 
 Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s 
motion for a mistrial. 
V 
 For the reasons given above, the District Court’s opinion is affirmed in all 
respects. 
